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Philosophers often talk of acts of omission, but such talk is immediately puzzling; for omissions (of all sorts) 
appear to be paradigms of not-doing rather than doing, even though no omission is merely a not-doing. But, as I 
shall seek to show, although talk of acts of omission is frequently misleading, it is not altogether inappropriate 
and is not to be eschewed, as some would argue.
1
 
 
My purpose in this paper is to provide an analysis of two concepts which I shall express by means of the 
phrases 'omit (to do)' and 'intentionally omit (to do)'.
2
 These two concepts are germane to action theory, even 
though relatively little attention has been paid to their analysis. Interest in providing an adequate account of 
omissions has recently risen, however, due to a rise in interest in such ethical and legal matters as killing versus 
letting die, Good Samaritanism, and so on— matters whose resolution is taken to be dependent upon a proper 
account of omissions. 
 
Providing an analysis of a concept (and by that I mean providing an informative set of conditions both 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the proper application of the concept in question), though one of 
the primary means of clarifying a concept, is often hampered when the term used to express the concept is 
ambiguous. For then singling out the concept to be analyzed proves difficult. Now, there is no doubt that 'omit' 
and its cognates are ambiguous, but this ambiguity is, I believe, systematic. That is, first, all senses of 'omit' 
(and its cognates) appear to presuppose a distinction between omitting to do something and simply not doing it 
and, second, there appears to be a broad sense of `omit' upon which more restrictive senses are based. In this 
paper I shall focus much of my attention on the broad sense of 'omit; it is the concept expressed by this sense of 
'omit' which will be the subject of analysis. How to analyze concepts expressed by more restrictive uses of 
'omit' will also be indicated. In addition, I shall treat the term 'intentionally omit' in similar fashion; that is, I 
shall seek to provide an analysis of its broadest sense and also indicate how more restrictive senses may be 
analyzed. 
 
Some philosophers have seized upon the distinction just mentioned between omitting to do something and 
simply not doing it and pronounced omissions to be 'negative actions', a sort of hybrid of doing and not-doing. 
For instance, in a recent article on Good Samaritanism John Kleinig claims that omissions can be said to be 
things that are done and calls them 'active nondoings'.
3
 Also, Arthur Danto distinguishes between not doing a 
and doing not-a and calls the latter forbearing'.
4
 But talk of negative actions or active nondoings is certainly 
odd. It is in fact not at all clear, either, what it means to prefix 'not' to a singular term 'a', since negation is 
traditionally applied to propositions.
5 
One way to try to avoid this problem concerning negation is to change 
from talk about 'doing a' to talk about 'bringing about p', where `1,' ranges over propositions. It seems that we 
may quite sensibly talk of bringing about not-p.
6
 But the question then arises: do all omissions involve the 
bringing about of the negation of a proposition? I think that it will be seen that this is not the case—at least with 
respect to that sense of 'omit' with which I am dealing here and which I take to be involved in much of the 
discussion of ethical and legal matters of the sort mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, I shall try to make sense of 
the locution 'act of omission'. 
 
The elusiveness of the concept of omission has apparently prompted certain prominent action theorists to ignore 
the concept altogether.' Nevertheless, there have been several attempts in the literature to provide adequate 
analyses of the concepts of omission and intentional omission. I shall discuss some of these later, once my own 
proposed analyses have been provided. My immediate concern is with providing my own analyses. Now, it 
might seem that a natural way to proceed at this point would be to attempt first to analyze the (basic) concept of 
omission in general and then to analyze the (basic) concept of intentional omission in particular. But the 
ambiguity of 'omit' previously noted renders this task extremely difficult, in that it proves not at all easy to make 
sure, in the absence of an account of intentional omission, that one has accounted for the broadest of those 
senses of 'omit' consonant with the distinction required between omission and mere not-doing. It is easier, I 
think, to tackle the analyses in reverse order, and so my strategy will be this. I shall consider what seems to be a 
relatively clear-cut case of a situation in which it is quite proper to ascribe an intentional omission to an agent 
and then I shall seek to discern its fundamental features. On the basis of this I shall propose an analysis of the 
concept of intentional omission in question, and then, on this basis, I shall provide an analysis of that concept of 
omission with which I am in general concerned here. 
 
This is the relatively clear-cut case. Last week Smith was sitting in a rocking-chair on his porch and a car 
accident occurred in the street right outside his house. He witnessed the accident and debated whether or not to 
go to the aid of the victims. Not wanting to disturb himself, and oblivious of his moral obligations, he decided 
to remain where he was, knowing full well that he could go to the victims' aid but that, in remaining seated, he 
would not, indeed could not, go to their aid. The upshot was that Smith callously continued to rock in his chair 
and the victims went unaided. 
 
I think that it is clear that Smith intentionally omitted to go to the victims' aid. The case, so described, surely 
warrants this claim. But what aspects of the case are necessary for Smith's intentional omission? This is a tricky 
question and, while I readily acknowledge that some of the claims that follow are not conclusively argued, I 
suggest that they are all true. 
 
First, Smith did not go to the aid of the victims. This is obviously a necessary condition of his intentionally 
omitting to go to their aid. Second, he debated going to their aid. Such debate is, I submit, not necessary for the 
intentional omission to act, although some measure of awareness or consideration of what one intentionally 
omits to do surely is. That is, had Smith not debated whether or not to go to the victims' aid but merely 
considered or been aware of his not going, we would not, I think, be required to retract our ascription of an 
intentional omission to him—so long, of course, as certain other conditions also obtained. Third, Smith debated 
remaining where he was. Again, such debate is, I believe, dispensable, although some measure of awareness of 
what one intentionally does is required. Fourth, Smith could have gone to the victims' aid. This is, I think, 
indispensable, although someone might object to this as follows. Suppose that, unbeknownst to him, Smith had 
been secured to his rocking-chair in such a fashion that, had he decided to go to the victims' aid, he would have 
found himself unable to do so. Would it not then still be appropriate to say that he intentionally omitted to go to 
their aid? I think not. It would be better to say in such a case that he omitted to try to go to their aid but that, 
because he in fact could not go to their aid, he did not actually omit to go to their aid. Fifth, Smith knew that he 
could go to the victims' aid. I suggest that such knowledge is not necessary for one's intentionally omitting to do 
something, but that some measure of belief(and hence, given the fourth point, true belief) is necessary.
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 (How 
strong such a belief must be is a matter that I shall leave entirely to one side.) Sixth, Smith knew that he could 
not both remain where he was and go to the victims' aid. Again, such knowledge of alternatives is, I think, not 
required, although Smith's truly believing that there were such alternatives is required. Seventh, Smith did not 
want to go to the victims' aid. Such lack of desire is not required. Suppose that Smith's daughter had been 
kidnapped and he felt that he must stay near the telephone next to his rocking-chair. He might very much have 
wanted to go to the victims' aid but, desiring even more to hear from the kidnappers, he intentionally omitted to 
go to their aid. Eighth, Smith intended not to go to the victims' aid. This is surely indispensable. Notice that 
Smith apparently also omitted to go to get a drink of water. Perhaps he had considered doing this as a third 
alternative. But if, when remaining seated, it was not his intention not to go and get a drink of water, he cannot 
be said to have intentionally omitted doing so then. Ninth, Smith intentionally remained where he was. This is 
not required, although something of its kind is. Suppose that, instead of remaining seated, Smith intentionally 
went to get that drink of water; then he would still have intentionally omitted to go to the victims' aid. So 
Smith's remaining seated is not required; still, some intentional action on his part is.
9
 Tenth, Smith is to be 
blamed for not going to the victims' aid. This is not required for the intentional omission to act. Many 
intentional omissions, such as Smith's, are morally reprehensible. But many are not. Suppose, once again, that 
Smith's daughter had been kidnapped and also that he had noticed that many other, apparently unhindered 
persons had witnessed the accident. It might well be that, in this case, Smith's not going to the victims' aid is not 
reprehensible; yet he would still, I think, be properly said to have intentionally omitted to go to their aid. 
 
The foregoing ruminations could doubtless be refined. Nevertheless, on their strength, I shall now propose an 
analysis of the relevant concept of intentional omission. For no necessary condition of the intentional omission 
to act has gone unmentioned, I believe, unless it be one (such as the condition that the agent exist) which is 
entailed by one already mentioned. The analysis is basically this: in the broadest sense of 'intentionally omit', 
intentionally omitting to do something is intentionally not doing something that one can do.10 But this requires 
unpacking. In what follows, the sort of belief at issue is occurrent belief and the sort of 'can' at issue is that 
which may be roughly characterized by the statement that a person can perform an action if and only if he has 
the ability and the opportunity to perform it.11 The analysis, in greater detail, is this: 
 
 
 
According to (I0), then, the important features of the Smith case are that Smith could have gone to the aid of the 
victims and also remained where he was, but he could not have done both; that he believed this; that he intended 
not to go to the victims' aid; and that he intentionally remained seated where he was. Note, of course, that (i) 
and (iv) of (JO) jointly imply that S does not do a at t. I shall refrain from explicitly stating further implications 
of (JO). 
 
(I0)'s acceptability granted, the next task is to provide an analysis of the relevant concept of omission in general. 
This task is now facilitated by taking note of two important points. First, it is necessarily true that, if (in the 
basic sense) S intentionally omits to do a, then (in the basic sense) he omits to do a; second, it is not necessarily 
true that, if (in the basic sense) S omits to do a, then (in the basic sense) he intentionally omits to do a. So our 
task is essentially one of whittling away at clauses (i) through (iv) of (10). 
 
One apparent instance of unintentional omission has already been cited. When Smith intentionally omitted to go 
to the aid of the victims of the car accident, he also omitted, but unintentionally, to go to get a drink of water. 
The reason why this omission was said to be unintentional was that Smith did not intend not to go and get a 
drink of water. So clause (iii) of (10) may now be dropped. Similarly, clause (iv) may also be dropped. Suppose 
Smith had not intentionally done anything; suppose he had been so nervous that he could not make up his mind 
what to do. Then, not only did he not intentionally do anything other than going to the victims' aid, but it seems 
he did nothing at all. Still, he omitted to go to the victims' aid; he omitted to go to get a drink of water; and so 
on. What of clause (ii)? Need it be the case that Smith believed he could go to the victims' aid? No; perhaps his 
indecision was a function not so much of nervousness but of a complete lack of confidence in his capabilities. 
Still, he can truthfully be said to have omitted to go to the victims' aid, it seems to me, just so long as he could 
have gone but did not. In fact, it is this simple fact concerning 'can' that in general seems to separate omissions, 
in the broadest sense of 'omit', from mere not- doings. (It need not even be the case, though perhaps it usually is 
the case, that there be some alternative act b that the agent can or does perform. This point was just made 
concerning indecision as to what to do.) That is, as an analysis of the relevant concept of omission in general, I 
propose the following: 
 
 
No doubt most omissions are not as 'bare' as (0) indicates they can be. Most cases of omitting to do a, for 
instance, may well involve doing some other act b; but all that (0) says is that there is a sense (and, I would add, 
an important and common sense) of 'omit' according to which omitting to do something a does not require doing 
something else b. Nevertheless, it may strike some that (0) allows omissions to be too `bare', that it stretches the 
term 'omit' beyond even its broadest sense and thereby admits too many not-doings into the class of omissions. 
Some, for instance, may prefer to stipulate that a not-doing, to be an omission, must be in some way 'untoward', 
that it must 'stand out' in some way. But, although I have some sympathy with this, there are two problems with 
making such a stipulation. The first problem is that it would seem to be too strong; for instance, as argued 
earlier, although Smith's not going to the victims' aid was in fact morally reprehensible, the case could have 
been altered so that his inaction would have been seen still to be a case of intentional omission even though not 
morally reprehensible. The second problem is that it seems extremely difficult to make precise the requirement 
that the inaction be untoward. Perhaps the requirement can be understood in terms of some long disjunction 
such as `S's not doing a at t is either morally reprehensible or contravenes some law or is not to be expected or 
would not be expected of S if he were normal or . . . (and so on)', but I for one certainly do not know how this 
disjunction is to be spelled out in detail. Indeed, I am not at all sure that it is required anyway. May we not 
simply say that some omissions are untoward and some not, and that it is only the former which are wont to 
engage our attention? This seems very reasonable to me. Notice that untoward omissions are of course still 
omissions on this account, while no toward not-doings would be omissions on the stricter account. Moreover, 
while there seems to be a sense of 'omit' according to which an omission fails to satisfy the stricter account, 
there seems to be no recognized sense of 'omit' according to which an omission fails to satisfy (0). 
 
Even this last statement may appear too strong, however. For it seems to be true not only that Smith omitted to 
go to the aid of the victims, but also that he omitted actually to aid them. But aiding them is not something he 
could have done at t (where t is the time of his omission to go to their aid); and so it seems that, according to 
clause (i) of (0), he did not omit to aid them, when in fact he did. 
 
But clause (i) of (0) does not have this implication. Granted, it implies that Smith did not omit at t actually to 
aid the victims at t, but it leaves open the question whether he omitted actually to aid them altogether. This is 
where the double time-index comes in handy. In general, there are many actions that one can at t perform at 
some other (later) time t'. The point is that Smith could at t have gone to the victims' aid at t and, all things 
being equal, this would have enabled him actually to aid them at a later time t'. So Smith could at t actually have 
aided the victims at C; and it is, I believe, because this is true that he may also be said to have omitted actually 
to aid the victim. That is to say, Smith omitted at t to aid the victims at t'; this is not to say either that Smith 
omitted at t to aid the victims at t or that omitted at t' to aid the victims at C . And so, generalizing on (0), we 
may, I think, say the following: 
 
 
 
Note that (0') still allows us to say (as it seems we would want to) that, for example, although I am not presently 
sunbathing in the Bahamas, neither am I presently omitting to sunbathe in the Bahamas—if what is meant by 
this is that I am not now omitting to sunbathe in the Bahamas now. Assuming that I can now go to the Bahamas 
and that, if I were todo so, I would soon be able to sunbathe there, (0') does commit us to saying both that I am 
now omitting to go to the Bahamas now and that I am now omitting to sunbathe in the Bahamas later—but both 
of these seem acceptable to me.
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(0), then, is a special case of (0'). This suggests that (JO) is a special case of some criterion (I0'). That is, it 
suggests that we can properly say of someone S that he intentionally omits at t to do a at t'. In order that cases 
where t' is distinct from t may be accommodated, a comprehensive and fairly complex formula is called for. The 
following is, I think, what is needed (where each of t*,, t*,, etc., is not earlier than t and not later than 1): 
 
 
 
(I0') allows us, then, to say not only that Smith intentionally omitted to go to the victims' aid but also that he 
intentionally omitted to aid them. 
 
Let us take stock of where we now stand. (0') and (JO') are intended to provide precise analyses of two concepts 
which are properly expressible in terms of 'omit' and 'intentionally omit', respectively, and which are supposed 
to be broad enough to serve as the basis for analyses of narrower but related concepts. It seems that they are 
well suited to this task. For instance, there is an important concept, which some choose to express simply in 
terms of 'omit', whose analysis is as follows: 
 
 
Clause (iii) of (OL') can be appended to (10') to form a criterion (10L') in order to provide an analysis of an 
important concept which some choose to express simply in terms of 'intentionally omit'. The pattern should be 
clear: the analysis of concepts more restrictive than those analyzed in (0') and (10') may be achieved by tacking 
on extra clauses to the analysans of each. 
 
Before turning to objections to (0') and (I0'), we would do well to compare them with analyses provided by 
others. Here I shall consider a few such analyses which are representative of those to be found in the available 
literature. Eric D'Arcy, for instance, contends that a person omits to perform an action if and only if he is in 
some way expected to perform it and yet does not perform it.
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 In light of (0'), this appears both too weak and 
too strong. It is too weak in that it allows for the possibility of omitting to do something that one cannot do, and, 
as I have argued, this seems incorrect. It is too strong—at least, too strong for the broadest sense of 'omit'—in 
that it requires that the agent be subject to certain expectations. Consider the case of Jones, who is in the habit 
of running a mile on all and only weekday mornings and who does not run a mile on the third Sunday in April. 
He is not in any way expected to run that day (he is under no obligation to do so; anyone who knows him well 
would not expect him to do so; and so on); nevertheless, it seems correct (though possibly pedantic) to say that 
he omits to run on that day. On the other hand, Michael Gorr has recently offered an analysis of a concept 
expressed in terms of 'omit' which is very close to (0') and runs as follows: S omits to perform a at t if and only 
if (i) it is not the case that S performs a at t, and (ii) S had the ability and the opportunity to perform a at t.
14
 My 
only criticism of this criterion concerns the absence of mention of times relative to S's ability and opportunity to 
perform a at t. The double time-index provided in (0') and (10') is, I have urged, necessary for a precise account 
of omissions. For instance, it seems odd to say S omits to perform a at t', even if clauses (i) and (ii) of Gorr's 
criterion are satisfied, when it is also true that S is dead at t. On the other hand, S's being dead at t is clearly 
compatible with his omitting at some earlier time t' (when he was alive) to do a at t. 
 
Myles Brand claims that a person refrains from performing an action a if and only if he does not perform a but 
performs some other action b in order that he may thereby prevent himself from performing a.
15
 There are 
problems with this. First, Brand offers his criterion as a criterion of the broadest type of not-doing which is not 
merely a not-doing. As such, it is considerably stronger than (0') and, in fact, much too strong. For it makes all 
such not-doing intentional, while it is surely possible for there to be unintentional omissions. (Standard cases of 
negligence, for instance, involve unintentional omissions.) Of course, 'refrain' has connotations of intentionality, 
and so it might be better to compare Brand's criterion with (I0'). But, once again, the criterion seems inadequate. 
As Douglas Walton has pointed out, if Smith gives his wife the keys to the liquor cabinet and unsuccessfully 
attempts to break it open two weeks later to get a glass of sherry, he can hardly be said to have refrained from 
drinking the glass of sherry.
16
 But (10') is adequate to ruling out this case, in so far as it appears to fail to satisfy 
both clause (i) and clause (iv) of that criterion. 
 
Other accounts of refraining have appeared recently (and I take refraining from doing something to be very 
similar to, if not the same as, intentionally omitting to do that thing). For instance, 0. H. Green says that a 
person refrains from performing an action a if and only if he can perform a and is aware of this, but does not 
perform a and is aware of this.
17 
 But, if by 'refrain' is meant what is meant by 'intentionally omit', this is surely 
too weak. The person concerned might simply be suffering from indecision such that, although he is aware that 
he can perform a and yet is not performing it, this is not due to any intentional omission on his part but merely 
to vacillation. So, too, Gorr says that a person intentionally omits to perform an action if and only if he omits to 
perform it and is aware of this.
18
 But this account is too weak, just as Green's is. Too weak, also, is the 
following account of deliberate omission provided by Roderick Chisholm: S deliberately omits to perform a if 
and only if S considers performing a and yet does not perform it.
19
 For, even if we grant that S can perform a, 
his not performing it might simply be due to vacillation on his part, in which case it would hardly be appropriate 
to say that he deliberately omits to perform it. As a final example, Elazar Weinryb offers an analysis of the 
concept of refraining according to which the agent need not be able to perform the action in question but only 
believe that he can.
20
 As argued above, however, it seems that it would have been incorrect to say, for instance, 
that Smith refrained from going to the victims' aid if he had unwittingly been secured to his chair. In addition, 
Weinryb makes no mention of intentionally performing an alternative action (or actions), but only (to put it a 
little roughly) of wanting not to perform the omitted action and believing that one can perform it, while in fact 
not performing it. But it is generally acknowledged that wanting to perform an action while performing it is not 
sufficient for performing it intentionally, and it likewise appears to be the case that wanting not to perform an 
action (even when one also believes that one can perform it), while in fact not performing it, is not sufficient for 
intentionally omitting to perform it. For instance, it seems that, whenever the agent in question satisfies 
Weinryb's conditions but also believes (falsely, of course) that he is, despite himself, performing the action, he 
will not be refraining from performing it. 
 
Still more accounts of omission and intentional omission are to be found in the literature,
21
 but it is time now to 
consider objections to (0') and (I0'); for, even though (0') and (I0') apparently avoid the problems that afflict the 
accounts just mentioned, they are not without apparent problems of their own. Other than objections already 
considered, the most obvious and probably the most telling objection is that the analyses provided in (0') and 
(I0') are given by means of appealing to concepts which are themselves obscure and deserving of analysis. I do 
not deny this. The concepts of belief, intention, doing, intentional doing, and 'can' all deserve analysis in their 
own right. So, if it is true at all that the foregoing dispels some of the mystery from omissions, this is true only 
in so far as it has been shown how the concepts of omission and intentional omission are related to other 
concepts, concepts which are themselves somewhat mysterious. Nevertheless, partial clarification is surely 
achieved thereby, and so I consider this a step in the right direction. 
 
It might be objected that it is in fact possible to do something while omitting to do it and that, since (0') and 
(10') both rule this out, they are defective. To support this objection the following case might be given.
22
 Brown 
is a professional assassin. He is also cautious. He always has a back-up plan in order to make doubly sure that 
his intended victim will die. On a certain day Brown's intended victim is Jones. As part of his back-up plan, 
Brown places a bomb in Jones's car, and then waits in the shadows, gun in hand, for Jones to appear. Jones 
appears; Brown raises his gun, but then lowers it, curious whether or not the new type of plastic explosive he 
affixed to Jones's car is efficacious. He discovers that it is. Now, Brown has killed Jones (the car blew up), but it 
seems that he has also omitted to kill Jones (he lowered his gun, but had he shot at Jones he would have killed 
him). Does this show the foregoing analysis to be defective? The answer is that it does not, for two reasons. 
First, there is the question of time. Even if S omits at t to do a at t', this is compatible with his doing a at some 
time other than t'. Secondly, there is the question of exactly what action a is. Suppose that, had Brown shot 
Jones, he would have done so at exactly the same time as the car exploded. Then there would have been no time 
differential with respect to what Brown did and what he omitted to do. One thing he did was to kill Jones—at t', 
say; it follows from (0') that there is no time t such that he omitted at t to kill Jones at 1'. But this is perfectly 
compatible with his omitting at t to shoot Jones at t'; it is also compatible with his omitting at t to kill Jones by 
shooting him at t'; and so on. 
 
Finally, it might be objected that (0') and (10') are not much help in determining why omissions are often 
thought to have such great moral and legal significance. But this seems to me an inappropriate objection for 
three main reasons. First, there is some help to be found in clause (i) of (0') and clause (i) of (10'): the agent can 
do otherwise, and this is often an indication that moral and legal responsibility is properly ascribable to the 
agent. I say 'indication' only, since being able to do otherwise is clearly not sufficient for being morally or 
legally responsible for what one does in fact do; indeed, as Harry Frankfurt persuasively argues, it may not even 
be necessary.
23
 Of course, if Frankfurt is right, the question arises as to whether one may be morally or legally 
responsible for a not-doing which is not an omission. I suspect that one may; but this is an issue that cannot be 
done justice here. 
 
Secondly, and more importantly, it is wrong to demand of an analysis that it be of significant help in resolving 
problems in areas where it is thought that the concept analyzed is applicable. Although one might hope for 
more, all that one should demand of an analysis is that it be accurate. I believe that (0') and (10') satisfy this 
condition. By way of comparison, I should point out that no even close-to-adequate analysis of the concept of 
action of which I am aware is of much help in affording comprehension of how it is that one might be morally 
or legally responsible for one's actions and their consequences. In this connection, it is also worth noting that 
some philosophers
24
 have claimed that one's moral responsibility for the harm one omits to prevent must be 
accounted for (if at all) in a fashion radically different from that in which one's moral responsibility for the harm 
one causes is accounted for, and they base this claim on the contention that omissions cannot have 
consequences. But while it may be true that omissions cannot have causal consequences (and even this is far 
from clear), it is surely false to say that they cannot have consequences of any sort; moreover, it is not at all 
clear that the consequences that omissions may have are not of that sort which is pertinent to the ascription of 
moral responsibility (and, perhaps, of which causal consequences are also instances).
25
 
 
Lastly, it should be noted that the hope that some philosophers have vested in an analysis of the concept of 
omission in terms of its providing the means for resolving such matters as killing versus letting die, Good 
Samaritanism, and so forth, has been based on the false contention that letting something happen is obviously 
identical with, or to be especially closely allied with, (intentionally) omitting to prevent its happening. Compare 
the following two cases involving what have come to be called active and passive euthanasia. In the first case, 
doctor A, for purposes of euthanasia, injects his patient with a lethal solution; doctor B witnesses this; also, 
doctor B could administer an antidote within ten seconds of the injection and save the patient, but does not; and 
so the patient dies. In the second case, doctor C, for purposes of euthanasia, pulls the plug on his patient's 
respirator; doctor D witnesses this; also, doctor D could replace the plug within ten seconds of its being pulled 
and save the patient, but does not; and so the patient dies. It seems clear from the descriptions of these two cases 
that what doctor A does is very similar in relevant respects to what doctor C does, while what doctor B does (or 
does not do) is very similar in relevant respects to what doctor D does (or does not do). It seems, too, 
appropriate to say that doctors B and D let their respective patients die. But pulling the plug is a commonly 
cited example of what has come to be called passive euthanasia, and the distinction between active and passive 
euthanasia is supposed to consist in, or partly in, the distinction between killing and letting die. So, if doctor C 
commits passive euthanasia, he lets his patient die, even though what he does seems very close in relevant 
respects to what doctor A does, who surely kills his patient closer, in fact, to what doctor A does than to what 
either doctor B or doctor D does (or does not do). Of course, 'relevant' is a catch-word that needs to be 
elucidated, and my intention here is not to deny that doctor B lets his patient die; for determining the truth of 
this claim must await clarification of the notion of dying from natural causes'. My point is only that letting die 
has no clear connection with (intentional) omission.
26
 Of course, it is true that doctors B and D omit to save 
their respective patients, but it is also true that doctors A and C omit to keep their respective patients alive. So, 
once again, the point can be made that not only is the connection between omitting and letting happen not clear, 
but in addition the correct attribution of phrases of the form 'does a' and 'omits to do b' to persons is not in itself 
a clear indication of how responsibility for a state of affairs is to be allocated. 
 
The question still remains, however: what are acts of omission? If (0') is correct, it is possible for someone to 
omit to do something and yet not act. In such a case, it is clear that there is an omission but no act or action. 
Hence, it is quite misleading to talk of omissions in general as 'negative actions' or 'active nondoings' which are 
'committed'. On the other hand, it is true that omissions are in fact often accompanied by actions—it is perhaps 
the case that they in fact always are so accompanied, although I doubt this—and it is true that we often accept 
that a person omitted to do something by doing, or because he did, or in virtue of doing, something else. In such 
cases as this, we may, I think, legitimately talk of acts of omission. But, if we do, are we thereby committed to 
saying that some omissions, at least, are actions? Not necessarily. If we adopt a 'coarsely-grained' ontology of 
events or states of affairs, we may perhaps accept that one and the same event or state of affairs is an act or 
action 'under one description' and an omission 'under another description'. But if we adopt a 'finely-grained' 
ontology of events and states of affairs, an identification of omissions and acts or actions will presumably be 
ruled out, even in those cases where we omit to do something by doing something else. Rather, omissions will 
be seen to be complex states of affairs consisting (at least) of a person's being able (in the sense of 'can' 
specified earlier) to do something and his not doing it. Intentional omissions will be seen to be even more 
complex, that is, to be states of affairs consisting (at least) of a person's being able to do each of at least two 
incompatible things, his believing this, his intending not to do one of them, and his intentionally doing the other 
or others. But even on such an ontology as this, we may—as indicated—still legitimately speak of acts of 
omission. For intentional omissions will still be seen as necessarily having actions as a part (see clause (iv) of 
(I0')), and many unintentional omissions are clearly intimately connected—by the 'by'-relation and other 
relations to actions, and so in both cases it appears appropriate—whatever ontology one adopts to speak of the 
actions in question as acts of omission.
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